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In any political system, the quality of political life is largely determined by
the relationship between the political actors and the mass of people whose
concern with politics is usually sporadic, self-centered, and indirect.
Political actors, especially at the national decision-making level, have
received a great deal of attention from students of Italian politics. Mass
publics have also been extensively studied. Political parties, which are one
of the principal means of linkage between elite and mass, have been an
important focus of attention for those interested in studying mass
mobilization. Here too the major point of interest has been national party
elites. And in the study of administration, paramount consideration has
likewise been devoted to national problems such as bureaucratic reform,
recruitment, and training, and administrative rules and practice.
Of course, this is a general pattern in comparative politics. It is
especially fitting in a country such as Italy, in which the central authorities
of state and party play a dominant role in the determination of policy for
all levels of government. But it is at the local level that the political system
touches people most directly. It is here that government is seen by the
population in the familiar context of day-to-day administration of
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comprehensible problems. It is here that the great issues of ideology and
principle are reduced to practical issues of water and sewers, of street
lights and school buildings, of an open door at the palazzo comunale or a
private cabal controlling the local affairs of state.
In contemporary Italy there is no single entity that is responsible for all
local matters. The governmental bureaucracy plays a central role. Parties
remain the most important of the informal channels of coordination.
Interest groups such as trade unions and religious associations likewise play
a significant though informal role.
The communal council is the representative body that unites the
concerns of party, formal and informal groups, and the state bureaucracy.
Councilors are usually party figures and, at the same time, they have
administrative responsibilities. Their activities are circumscribed not only
by the accumulated body of administrative law and practice but also
directly by agents of the central government. In addition, financial
constraints leave little surplus to be used at the discretion of local
authorities. Hence their ability to be creative and innovative in the analysis
and solution of the problems plaguing the cities of Italy is severely
curtailed. As a consequence the role of the communal councilor in the
political system has tended to be minimized.
The Italian bureaucracy is crucial in the day-to-day conduct of local
affairs. The party dominates in the articulation of local political issues as
well as in the mobilization of the population. The communal councilor is
often seen as falling between these two stools of administration and party,
subservient to both and lacking in authority in his own right.
Is this in fact a true picture? It is the picture reflected, on the one hand,
in the literature on administrative law and, on the other, in the
conventional wisdom of politicians and scholars alike. The literature on
local government and politics in Italy is dominated by the tradition of
administrative law, which is concerned with legal norms and not with
administrative practices or political behavior. In the words of an American
political scientist writing about the study of local politics in his own
country, it is a &dquo;lost world&dquo; from the viewpoint of empirical research
(Herson, 1957).1 However, there is a vast literature on local communities
in Italy that is not legalistic. Much of it is in the anthropological tradition
and focuses on single communities. Herein lies its major weakness: it does
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not provide for systematic sampling and is not representative of the total
universe of Italian communities.
Another problem in studying Italian local politics is the intrusion of
influences from outside the community. It is a general limitation of the
community political systems approach that it tends to treat the local
system in isolation from its environment, and especially the larger political
system. In Italy this temptation is not as strong as it might be, for
example, in the United States. The intrusion of the central government in
Rome in local administration and the centralized nature of the party
system make the lack of local autonomy obvious to all. But this makes it
even more difficult to achieve a balanced picture of the local decision-
making process.
In this exploratory study we will begin to sketch in national patterns in
local decision-making in a systematic fashion; we will rely on data from
interviews with several hundred communal councilors from all parts of
Italy. Our present concern is with the formal decision-making process of
the commune; our focus is on the individual councilor and his perceptions
of this process. This permits us to evaluate several assumptions concerning
local decision-making, including its presumed domination by the mayor, or
by interest groups, or by parties; its democratic or nondemocratic nature;
its dependence on bureaucrats or on outside experts; and several other
often repeated but seldom researched generalizations. Some of these
assumptions are shown to be well founded. Others require reformulation.
Still others are simply false.
Our data consist of 382 interviews with a national sample of communal
councilors taken in the spring of 1968. Although this stands alone as an
independent study, it also was conceived as a middle-level-elite data set to
complement a national mass sample and a sample of national deputies
obtained during the same year. The 75 communes chosen are a
one-in-three sample of the 225 used in the mass sample; interviews were
actually obtained in only 69 communes. As the mass sample was stratified
by size of commune and geographical area, this subsample likewise is
roughly representative of communes of different sizes and from different
parts of the country. However, while the communes are thus representa-
tive of all Italian communes, the councilors were chosen on the basis of a
quota of six from each commune to include two Christian Democrats
(DC); two Socialists (PSI-PSDI)-the PSI (Socialist Party) and PSDI (Social
Democratic Party) were one party at the time of the fieldwork; and two
Communists (PCI). Interviewers were instructed to include, where possi-
ble, the mayor, vice mayor, and leader of the opposition in order to insure
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representation of the more influential members of the council in the
sample. Of the 450 councilmen in the sample, 400 were interviewed; of
these, 18 interviews were discarded because they were incomplete or
because interviewers selected councilmen who turned out to be from
parties other than the major three. The sample obtained reflects a good
geographical representation of Italian communes; but because we limited
the selection to members of the three major parties and obtained a roughly
equal number of councilors from each, it should not be considered a
representative sample of Italian councilors.
A further reservation is in order. This is a pilot study using systematic
sampling and interviewing techniques in order to generalize about the
decision-making process in Italian communes. The need to gather data that
were comparable to the deputy and mass interviews, which are not utilized
in this analysis, limited somewhat the range of potential theoretical
interests that could be pursued. And one of the inherent limitations of the
methodology is the focus on cognitive and attitudinal orientations rather
than behavior. This is a study of the perceptions of councilmen of the
decision-making process. An evaluation of the fit between their percep-
tions and reality must await studies that profit from different and varied
research strategies.
THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL DECISION-MAKING
Political decisions may be made anywhere within the political system,
but they are formalized in governmental structures. Political roles are
likewise acted out within structures. We begin with an examination of
these structures and how they are viewed by the individual councilmen.
The formal structure of communal government can be described briefly
as follows. Responsibility for local affairs is divided between the provincial
prefect and his subordinates, on the one hand, and the elected mayor and
council, on the other-a pattern adapted from the Napoleonic system. The
communal bureaucracy is responsible to both. The mayor and council are
charged with certain responsibilities under national law, and only after
these obligations have been met do they have much discretion in dealing
with local matters. The mayor, in fact, serves as a representative of the
central government as well as of tue council. The inadequate taxation
powers given local government mean that most resources are devoted to
meeting legally sanctioned obligations with little left for local initiatives.
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The council is elected from party lists by a system of proportional
representation in communes of more than 5,000 inhabitants (at the time
of the study-it has since been raised to 10,000); in smaller communes
four-fifths of the seats go to the party list that obtains a plurality, with the
remainder divided proportionally. It is not uncommon, especially in the
smaller communes, for a party list to contain names of local citizens who
are not closely identified with that party. However, most successful
independents are elected on a party list. The council selects the giunta,
which is the cabinet at the local level; it is often a coalition. Members of
the giunta, called assessors, have responsibilities for particular subject
matters. The council also selects the mayor. In practice, this is decided by
the parties in the negotiations leading up to the formation of the giunta. If
the parties cannot agree on a giunta, or if the giunta is dissolved by the
prefect for alleged irregularities, the commune may be administered
directly by the prefect and his representatives. Two of the communes in
our sample were under prefectural administration or without a giunta at
the time of the study. The common pattern is for the council to reflect the
voting strength of the parties in the commune and for the giunta to be a
coalition of the leading parties, except in the smallest communes.
Analysis of the composition of the local giunta indicates the great
impact that national political arrangements have on local coalitions. The
giunta functions as the cabinet at the local level, and its composition
determines the climate of opinion within which decisions are made. The
pattern of local coalitions before and after the formation of the
Center-Left coalition on the national level demonstrates the great impact
that the national &dquo;Opening to the Left&dquo; had on local political matters (see
Figure 1). The &dquo;Opening to the Left&dquo; involved bringing the Socialists into
a coalition with the Christian Democrats. It was achieved gradually. First,
the PSI supported the government from outside, then took ministerial
positions later. The PSDI had been in the government on and off for many
years. The cooperation of the two parties led to their merger, so at the
time of the study in 1968 they were a single party. They subsequently
split again.
The &dquo;Opening to the Left&dquo; had been pioneered in local politics in
several areas of Italy before this arrangement was worked out at the
national level. Before the PSI entered the national government, the party
was included in very few Center-Left governments (7% of the total) and
they were all in communes in northwestern and central (the &dquo;Red Belt&dquo;)
Italy.2 Almost half of the total communes in the sample had Christian
Democratic governments, and another 9% had Christian Democratic plus
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Figure 1: COMPOSITION OF GIUNTE BEFORE AND AFTER FORMATION OF
NATIONAL CENTER-LEFT
Social Democratic or Republican coalitions. Almost one-fourth of the
communes had Left governments, meaning in most cases Communists or
Communists and Socialists. And there were a few Rightist or Center-Left
coalitions (9%).
In geographical terms, the Left and Center-Left governments were
widely scattered, though more common in central Italy than elsewhere.
The Center coalitions were likewise widely dispersed, with the Northwest
having the heaviest concentration. The DC was stronger in the smaller
communes than in the larger. It ruled alone in two out of three communes
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under 20,000. In the smallest communes it was aided by the special
electoral system that guaranteed a majority to one party (see Figure 2). In
fact, there is a monotonic increase in the participation of the small center
parties and a dramatic decline in the monocolori (one party) governments
with the increase in communal size.
Figure 2: COMPOSITION OF GIUNTE BY SIZE OF COMMUNE
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The maturation of the Center-Left on the national level changed the
local patterns considerably. The predominance of the Christian Democrat-
ic monocolori or Center coalition local governments was replaced by the
predominance of Center-Left coalitions. The change was greatest in the
larger communes. Communes with Left governments declined to about
16% of the sample; the Right and Center-Right percentage likewise
declined, while Christian Democratic monocolori governments slipped to
26% of the total, heavily concentrated in the smaller communes.
In geographical terms the Center-Left is strongest in the Northwest and
in the Islands. In the Northeast, Christian Democratic monocolori
governments remain strong, as do those of the Left. This results from the
polarization that exists in this area of Christian Democrat strength in the
Veneto and Leftist strength in Emilia-Romagna, which renders collabora-
tion between the Christian Democrats and Socialists difficult to achieve.
Besides this, coalitions are less often necessary because of the strength of
each of the blocs.
We asked respondents, &dquo;Why and how was the majority changed?&dquo;-and
found, not surprisingly, that the larger the commune the more often
national political motives were cited as the reason, from 9% in the smallest
communes to 22%, 32%, 40%, and 36% in the largest communes. In the
latter, Christian Democrats were somewhat more likely to view national
political considerations as the reason, whereas Socialists in general and
especially in the larger communes were likely to view personal motives as
responsible. As it was the Socialists who switched sides most often,
perhaps they are more sensitive to the many personal motivations that lay
behind the party’s change in local partners. It is of interest that no one
mentioned party intervention as the cause. One expected finding is that
polarization of the parties reduces the importance of personal motives.
The Northeast and Center, where the Left is especially strong in some
areas and the DC in others, were for all parties the areas with the smallest
percentage mentioning personal reasons for the change. In these areas the
strength of the parties and their affiliated mass organizations undoubtedly
leads to a relative depersonalization of politics.
When we examine the councilmen’s perceptions of which parties were
closest to each other in local politics, the results are inconclusive. As a
result of the small sample size it is difficult to evaluate the importance of
differences between the Communists’ perceptions and those of councilors
of the DC and PSI-PSDI. But they indicate that DC and PSI-PSDI
councilmen tend to view relations among the Center-Left parties as being
much tighter than they are viewed by PCI councilmen. Perhaps this is due
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to the attempt of the Communists to maintain the fiction of ties on the
left even when they are in disarray. Perhaps the continued cooperation of
Communists and Socialists in trade unions also plays a role in shaping the
perceptions of the Communists. At any rate, in several areas Communists
view ties with the PSI as being close.
The absence of strong alliances among parties in the smaller communes
is likewise striking. More than one-quarter of the councilmen from these
communes did not indicate any strong ties, and these were evenly divided
among the parties and heavily concentrated in the two smallest categories
of communes. This is clear confirmation of the relative absence of
party-based partisanship in the smaller communes; it is likely that
clientelistic patterns predominate there regardless of the party labels.
SPECIALIZATION IN COMMUNAL POLITICS
A degree of specialization is common to most assemblies. The demands
of government are extensive; the need for attention to details of legislation
and administration are considerable. The division of labor is necessary in
this field as in others. On the other hand, the work of the communal
council, while involving legislation, is not as involved and time-consuming
as that of national legislatures; in the smaller communes there may in fact
be few decisions to be made. Variation in demands on councilmen is a
function of local needs and problems as well as their own political
commitments. As mentioned earlier, the autonomy as well as the resources
of local governments are limited in Italy. The important role played by the
party in Italy suggests the need for models of policy formulation and
expertise that incorporate party organization in the decision-making
structure.
There are differences in the degree of specialization among the
communes according to their size and area of the country. The
relationship between specialization and size of commune is not a linear
one. Though it is unwise to make too much of the limited number of
cases, our evidence shows that the councilors in the DC and PSI-PSDI have
the greatest opportunity to take an interest in particular subjects in the
middle-sized communes, while in both small and large communes their
opportunities seem to be more limited. For the PCI, on the other hand,
the maximum is reached in the largest communes (see Table 1).
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TABLE 1
COUNCILMEN WITH SPECIAL FIELDS OF INTEREST
BY SIZE OF COMMUNE AND PARTY (in %)
It is somewhat surprising that only 58% of the total claim a special field
of interest. Predictably, the Communists and Socialists are more special-
ized, because they are more tightly organized. But the relatively small
difference among the three parties is perhaps more significant than the fact
that there are differences.
Geographical differences in specialization also exist (table not shown).
There is in general a greater amount of specialization in the Center and
North than in the South, and in this as in many other respects, the Islands
resemble the Center and North more than the South.
The fields of interest of the councilors do not vary much among the
parties: most often cited are public works (17%), youth and education
(11%), and work and welfare (9%). Nor are territorial differences
important, except that those interested in health are heavily concentrated
in the South.
The DC councilors under age forty are somewhat more likely to
indicate their special interests than those over forty, which perhaps reflects
the growing professionalization of that party. In the other two parties
there are no important differences between the two age groupings.
In conclusion, specialization is limited. The relationship between
specialization and size of commune is curvilinear, reinforcing our overall
finding that in the middle-sized communes the parties and councilmen
seem to function most effectively.
SOURCES OF ADVICE ON COMMUNAL MATTERS
This and the following sections examine the question of how the
individual councilman goes about making up his mind on council matters.
With the research techniques employed, this process cannot be examined
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directly. Rather, we begin by looking at the councilman’s sources of advice
on matters before the council on the assumption that these are relevant in
conditioning his final decisions. This procedure reveals the perceptions of
the councilman as to whom he should consult, but it does not indicate the
extent or nature of influence or even of actual interaction. In the
following section we examine the councilman’s evaluation of the impor-
tance of the opinions of various groups.
The respondent was asked, &dquo;Before coming to a decision on a
communal problem, do you ask information or advice about the
problem?&dquo; If the response was &dquo;yes,&dquo; the question &dquo;From whom?&dquo; was
posed. The categories used in the code emerged from the respondents’
statements themselves.
The first important finding is the absence of large and profound
differences among the political parties in the patterns of responses.
Although the percentages in each category vary from party to party, the
same categories are, in a rough fashion, the principal ones for each. Thus
we will give considerable attention to what in fact are sometimes marginal
differences among the parties (see Table 2).
Only 11-13% in each of the parties failed to mention a source of advice,
a remarkably similar portion. These respondents are heavily concentrated
in the smaller communes, with the pattern being the same for all the
parties. Moreover, there are no important geographical differences in these
patterns. Councilmen in all parties are more likely to seek advice if their
party is represented in the giunta, thus reflecting the fact that they have a
greater incentive for consultation when they are in a position to influence
TABLE 2
SOURCES OF ADVICE (in %)
[190]ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / AUGUST 1974
communal decision-making. Councilmen of majority parties are also more
constrained to seek contacts outside their own party, perhaps due to their
responsibility for the affairs of the entire commune rather than a mere
segment of it.
A number of potential sources of advice turn out to have little
importance. For example, no one in the sample mentioned the prefect and
only three percent mentioned the communal bureau, which is remarkable
considering the role of national legislation in local administration. Nor is
public opinion an important source of guidance for the councilmen, as
only five percent mentioned it and two-thirds of these were Communists.
Neither did many respondents mention the multitudinous associations,
such as trade unions, farm organizations, religious groups, and so on, that
are thought to be of great importance in local politics. Perhaps they will be
of increasing importance in the future, as the DC and PCI councilmen
under forty referred to them more often than those over forty.
The most important category turned out to be &dquo;experts,&dquo; which here
refers to individuals who have specialized knowledge about the subject.
However, this category does not include representatives of the party or of
interest groups, as these were coded separately. For the three parties
combined, 32% of the total mentioned experts. This reflects a considerable
concern with information-gathering. Experts were more often mentioned
in Northeastern and Central Italy than in the South and Islands. And it is
the councilmen in the larger communes who rely most heavily on this
source of advice: except for the smallest category of communes the
progression is monotonic, falling from 31% in the smallest category, to
22% in the next, then rising to 35%, 41 %, and, finally, to 59% in the
largest category. Moreover, young councilmen in all the parties mention
experts more often. Hence reliance on experts may reflect the greater
professionalization and specialization in politics in the larger communes
and among the young in general, or it may reflect the complexities of
decisions in larger communes and the inexperience of the young. For the
DC the progression from the smallest to the largest communes is 20, 25,
39, 53, and 50%; for the PCI 27, 24, 19, 27, and 64%; for the PSI-PSDI it
is 42, 17, 21, 42, and 64%. Perhaps for the PCI and PSI-PSDI in the
smaller communes these &dquo;experts&dquo; are in fact party-related advisers from
outside the local party who work with the unsophisticated councilmen. In
the early postwar years, for example, the Communists and Socialists
formed a &dquo;League of Communes,&dquo; a party-related but separate organiza-
tion, to provide professional and administrative advice to Leftist local
governments.
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Two additional sources of advice are of about equal overall importance,
but not for the same parties. Some 20% of the total rely on their own
parties as their major sources of advice. PSI-PSDI councilmen most
frequently mention their own party (30%), with Communists next (19%)
and those from the DC last (13%). The greater importance attributed to
the party by PSI-PSDI councilmen is strange, for it runs counter to
impressionistic evidence concerning the strength of the various party
organizations. The party is considered more important in middle-sized
communes, and hence reflects the general finding that it is there that the
party functions most effectively as an organization.
The final source of advice to be considered is the giunta itself. Of the
total sample, 19% mention it; it is listed most frequently by the Christian
Democrats (24%), followed by the PSI-PSDI (20%) and PCI (13%). As
councilmen with majority ties to the giunta are much more likely to rely
on it, this DC reliance is not surprising, as it is a part of the giunta much
more often than the other two. Of course, when the party controls the
giunta, party and communal leadership tend to merge.
The above findings, it will be recalled, are based on responses to
open-ended questions. When the question is placed in the context of
weighing the importance to be attached to points of view held by various
persons, different orderings emerge. These differences undoubtedly reflect
the respondent’s normative evaluations of what he thinks is proper. And in
this case, the opinions of experts or prestigious people are placed at the
bottom of the list. Respondents were asked, &dquo;In taking a position on a
particular problem what is the order of importance that you give the
following opinions?&dquo; They were to rank order the following: personal
conviction, voters’ opinions, party’s position, and opinions of experts or
prestigious people.
Personal conviction was ranked first by members of every political
party. The next most numerous answer was voter’s opinions, placed first
by roughly equal portions of each party. The party’s position followed in
importance, with opinions of experts or prestigious people ranked first by
the smallest portion of people (see Table 3).
Geographical differences follow no consistent pattern, but size of
commune is very important. In the largest communes, councilmen of all
the parties were more likely to rank personal conviction first, amounting
to 58% of the DC, 36% of the PCI, and 55% of the PSI-PSDI in the
communes over 200,000 in size. On the whole, voters’ opinions were more
likely to be ranked first in the middle-sized communes; this is consistent
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TABLE 3
IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS OPINIONS BY PARTY
(% attaching &dquo;much&dquo; importance)
with the other evidence presented that the ties between citizen and local
elites are stronger in the middle-sized communes. It is in these communes
that party organization and competition are likely to be sufficiently strong
to encourage extensive mobilization. In the larger communes mobilization
is more impersonal and ties less direct and immediate. There is little
mobilization in the smaller communes.
IMPORTANCE OF OPINIONS OF
VARIOUS GROUPS
The previous section examined patterns of consultation. This section
will examine the importance attached to the opinions of various groups by
the councilmen. As in earlier analyses, it is important to bear in mind that
the answers to these questions do not necessarily reflect the actual
decision-making rules employed. Councilmen may in fact act on criteria
and sources of information quite different from those indicated here.
These answers do, however, undoubtedly reflect their normative evalua-
tions of what is the proper answer to give, and in this respect are
important. Moreover, it is highly likely that actual decision-making rules
are closely related to these evaluations on most issues. From the long-range
perspective of a political career it is probable that the value attached to the
opinions of different individuals and groups is going to have a major
impact on the content of the decisions made by the councilman. Thus the
following analysis should be interpreted as reflecting not the impact of
particular groups on particular decisions but rather the influence that they
have on the total decision-making process of the councilman.
In the interview, the respondent was asked, &dquo;Would you please tell me
what importance you would give to the opinions of the following persons,
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that is, do you attach much, some, little or no importance to the opinions
of [close friends, members of your family, clerics and religious officials,
labor leaders, colleagues or work comrades, managers or employers,
politicians, and public opinion in general].&dquo; Table 4 summarizes the
results by party of each of these. The differences among the parties
revealed here are too striking to be artifacts of sampling. They reveal that
the DC local leaders claim to pay relatively little attention to the opinions
of the working class, whether expressed in references to labor leaders or to
work colleagues. And only half as many PSI-PSDI councilmen as PCI
respondents attached &dquo;much&dquo; importance to this group. Furthermore, DC
local politicians claimed to pay even less attention to the views of
managers and employers than those in the other two parties, regardless of
what the actual ties are between business and the DC.3 Friends and family
are somewhat more important for the DC than for the other two parties.
Politicians and public opinion in general are less significant for the DC. As
would have been expected, the importance for the PCI of labor leaders and
colleagues or work comrades was great.
Given the small numbers involved it is not wise to overstate the
importance of territorial differences. However, a few patterns emerge with
such strength and consistency that they merit mention despite the
statistical hazards involved. Friends and family are important for the
Christian Democrats and the Communists in the Northeast, while in the
Center, on the contrary, these categories reach their lowest level of
importance. For the PSI-PSDI, on the other hand, there are few territorial
differences on these two variables. The importance of the opinions of
clerics and religious officials is directly related to the importance of
TABLE 4
IMPORTANCE OF OPINIONS OF VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS
AND GROUPS BY PARTY (% attaching &dquo;much&dquo; importance)
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religion in politics in the area, and this is true for all the parties. For the
DC, religious authorities are more important in the Northeast and in the
South and less important in the Northwest and Center. The range for the
DC is from a low of 23% of the respondents in the Northwest assigning
&dquo;much&dquo; importance to them, to a high of 50% in the Northeast. The
strange phenomenon of supporters of the two leftist parties paying
attention to the opinions of representatives of the church can be explained
in the same fashion-where the church is strong, everyone listens. Thus, in
the Northeast 19% and in the South 20% of the PCI councilmen rate
clerical opinions of &dquo;much&dquo; importance.
Strong patterns likewise emerge in relation to the importance of
opinions of union leaders and workers. Where they are electorally
important for a party, they are listened to. For the PCI they are very
important in the Northeast and Northwest; they are less important there
for the PSI-PSDI. In the Center, on the other hand, they are less important
for all the parties. Perhaps the strength of the Left in that area renders
working-class support unlikely for the DC, while the availability of other
sources of support, especially from the agricultural sector, reduces its
importance for the PCI. Sources are roughly similar for the PCI and
PSI-PSDI in the Center, meaning that unions and workers are less
important there than elsewhere for the PCI but more so for the PSI-PSDI;
undoubtedly the latter is due to the patterns of cooperation between
Communists and Socialists that have developed in this part of Italy.
Opinions of managers and employers are nowhere viewed as important.
Perhaps that would be impolitic. There are likewise no dramatic territorial
differences in the importance attached to the opinions of politicians.
However, there are slight but consistent and monotonic differences for all
the parties regarding the importance of public opinion; as one proceeds
southward public opinion is stated to be more and more relevant. Though
the differences are small, they seem meaningful.
The size of the commune makes a difference in patterns of influence. In
particular, the importance of friends and family, especially in the DC,
varies according to size. Only in the DC is there a slight tendency for
friends to be more important in the smallest and largest communes.
Family seems much more important for all parties in the smallest
communes, and for the two secular parties the differences are consider-
able. Thus 88% of the PCI members in the smallest communes rate the
opinions of family high, with those in the largest communes giving the
second highest rating (55%).
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TABLE 5
IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO OPINIONS OF LABOR
LEADERS BY PARTY AND SIZE OF COMMUNE
(% attaching &dquo;much&dquo; importance)
The opinions of clerics and religious authorities were rated highest by
DC councilmen in the smallest (53%) and the largest (58%) communes.
Consistent patterns do not emerge for the other two parties.
The importance of labor unions increased with the size of commune up
to the very largest category, where it declines. This is true of all the
parties, even though the percentages involved vary widely (see Table 5).
For the secular partes the impact of the opinions of colleagues and work
associates follows t.1e same pattern as that of labor unions. For the DC,
however, there is no discernible pattern.
The final three categories of influence suggest no important generaliza-
tions. Neither the opinions of managers and employers nor of politicians
follow regular patterns that can be detected within a sample of this size.
This is also true of public opinion, though there seems to be an irregular
pattern of increasing importance of public opinion with increasing size of
commune.
This analysis of the importance of the opinions of various groups thus
leads to few surprises. In general, the pattern of group relations is the
anticipated one.
THE INFLUENTIALS IN DECISION-MAKING
Having examined group influences on councilmen, we will now consider
several other dimensions of influence. The first is the councilman’s
evaluation of the influence of various political figures in the decision-
making process. This question was posed in the following manner: &dquo;In
your judgment, in the decisions of the commune do the following people
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have much, average or no influence?&dquo;-and the following figures were
named one at a time: mayor, communal assessors, councilmen, local party
leaders, provincial party leaders, national party leaders, communal
functionaries, provincial functionaries, and national functionaries.
In order to give an overall view of the results, Table 6 summarizes the
importance attached to the influence of each source, by party. The results
are as expected. The mayor is the most important in all of the parties, with
assessors and local party leaders ranked next. The differences among the
parties are likewise predictable. PCI councilmen, perhaps because they are
more often in the minority, attach more importance to the party leaders at
all levels than do those of the other two parties. They also attribute more
significance than do others to functionaries at all levels. Indeed, PCI
councilmen generally attribute influence much more widely than the
others, perhaps reflecting a more politicized view of the local universe.
Whether the party is in a majority or minority position in the commune
makes a difference for the Communists as it does for the other parties; for
79% of them from Leftist communes viewed the mayor as having &dquo;much&dquo;
influence. The young more than the old in all parties view the mayor as
being more important. Functionaries are also more important for the
young.
Territorial differences are not great, but they are consistent. The mayor
is most influential within all the parties in the Northwest and Northeast,
and least so in the Center. The South and Islands fall in between. Perhaps
the dominance of the Left combined with the greater role of the party
organization within the Left renders the particular office holders less
TABLE 6
INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS SOURCES ON COMMUNAL POLITICS
(% attributing &dquo;much&dquo; influence)
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important in the Center than they are in other parts of the country.
Compared with other areas, the influence of the mayor in the Center is
rated lower by the DC and PSI-PSDI councilors than by those from the
PCI.
Of greater significance than territory in accounting for differences in
influence is size of commune. For the DC and the PSI-PSDI the mayor is
most important in the smallest and largest communes; the PCI pattern is
irregular. Party leaders in the DC and PCI are more important in the largest
communes; for the PSI-PSDI party leaders are more important in the
middle categories. Not surprisingly, communal functionaries are more
important in the smallest communes for all parties.
The influence of several other groups on local politics was also
evaluated, as well as the manner in which that influence was exercised. The
question was, &dquo;Now I would like to ask your judgment about the
intervention of some groups and about the organization of communal
politics. To each of the following judgments would you please answer yes
or no?&dquo; The respondent was then asked whether the group was interested
in local politics, whether it was influential, and whether it exercised that
influence directly or through a political party. The groups mentioned were
communal employees, industry, the clergy, labor unions, agricultural
organizations, and the press.
Differences among the parties are those that could be anticipated by
knowledge of the party’s general orientation (table not shown). Equally of
note is the agreement among the parties on some of the issues. There is a
large measure of accord that communal employees have little overall
interest. The parties view the role of industry somewhat differently.
One-third of the PCI group attributed influence to it, which is slightly
more than in the other two parties. There are few territorial differences
concerning the influence of industry. DC and PCI councilmen from the
Center and PCI and PSI-PSDI respondents from the Northwest see
industry as most interested.
The impact of size of commune replicates the general pattern that
groups are viewed as more involved in the middle-sized communes. And
contrary to the conventional wisdom, the clergy are not viewed by any of
the parties as more interested in the smaller communes.
Differences concerning the impact of labor unions follow expected
lines, with the PCI viewing them as more interested but with less influence.
All parties perceive them as being more interested in the Center. And they
are hardly involved at all in the smallest communes. The same patterns
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hold for the intervention of agricultural organizations, though the
differences are small. They are perceived as interested in the South and by
the DC and PSI-PSDI councilmen.
The parties are remarkably similar as far as the press is concerned. It is
not of tremendous importance anywhere, though it is seen as even less
relevant in the smallest communes.
Thus size of commune seems to be the most important variable
affecting the interest and influence of various groups. The payoff for
intervention is minimal in the smallest communes; and, for all parties on
all issues, intervention and influence tend to rise with size of commune.
One partial exception concerns agricultural groups, which, as would be
expected, are more active in middle-sized communes than in the smallest
and largest ones. A second partial exception concerns the clergy: while the
percentage of respondents that views the clergy as interested rises with the
size of the commune, the percentage that feels that the clergy has no
influence even though interested also rises with size of the commune. Thus
the involvement but not the influence of the clergy is seen as rising with
communal size. The perceived influence of trade unions grows with the
size of the communes, but falls off in the largest. Thus groups seem to
have the greatest influence in the middle-sized communes.
A final important point remains concerning influences on local
decision-making. The predominance of political and structural over
personal variables is remarkable. The respondents’ age, occupation, and
level of education are not very powerful explanatory variables. They may
contribute to understanding particular situations, as there are some
differences in their importance among regions and categories of size of
commune. But they do not add up to national patterns of differences.
Undoubtedly many local situations contradict one another; that is, the
better educated may be more anti-clerical in one area and less so in
another, and so on.
Only a few generalizations concerning these personal variables seem
warranted by our data. Friends and family are somewhat more important
for those low in occupational status and education. Within the DC, those
lower in educational level have a higher regard for the clergy, but this is
not true in other parties. All of these relationships are weak. These
individual variables are undoubtedly important in understanding differ-
ences between the parties; they do not, however, have much impact on
differences within the parties. The importance of structural variables is
reaffirmed by the final section, which deals with patterns of decision-
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making in local affairs. First, however, sources of initiative within the
council will be examined.
INITIATIVE WITHIN THE COUNCIL
There is overwhelming agreement that the giunta takes the initiative in
proposing new measures in the commune. However, party differences are
of interest, as 66% of the PCI, 91 % of the DC, and 89% of the PSI-PSDI
respondents credit the giunta with the function of initiating proposals.
These differences undoubtedly reflect the fact that the Center-Left parties
can rely on the giunta for leadership while the PCI, being usually in
opposition, must look elsewhere. Thus when the giunta is Leftist, 90% of
the PCI councilmen credit it with most local initiative, compared with 56%
when it is Center-Left. The PSI-PSDI, which participates in most Left and
Center-Left coalitions, gives the giunta high scores across the board. The
DC does also. Obviously, the giunta provides the principal leadership for
the governing parties, whichever they are.
Among ordinary councilmen-those who are not mayors, vice mayors,
assessors, or opposition leaders-those in the PCI most frequently view
themselves as having important roles in local decision-making. Further-
more, the Communists in the sample attributed more importance to
national leaders. Only in the PCI are territorial differences important on
this variable, as more PCI respondents in the South than elsewhere attach
importance to their own views and to those of national party leaders.
Size of commune seems not to make much difference. National party
leaders are viewed as more important in the larger communes, as would be
expected, and individual councilmen are slightly more often viewed as
responsible for local initiatives in the smaller communes. But the
differences are not dramatic when viewed against the overwhelming
majority everywhere that views the giunta as the most important source of
initiative.
HOW THE COUNCIL DECIDES
The final section is devoted to an analysis of the councilor’s perceptions
of patterns of local decision-making. The political process within the
council was investigated by means of a forced-choice technique that
imposed a structure on the almost infinite variation possible in local
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decision-making. The respondent was asked to examine four statements
concerning the councils’ decision processes and to choose the one that best
characterized his own experiences. The alternatives are as follows:
(1) The councilmen group themselves to support or oppose various
provisions according to the merit of each problem.
(2) Councilmen of the same party vote together but alliances among
parties change according to the various problems.
(3) For the majority of problems, alliances among various parties are
more or less permanent.
(4) Councilmen who are followers of local personalities or who belong
to the same social class vote together.
The party divisions on this question are presented in Table 7.
An initial observation is that the overall differences among the parties
are minimal. The reason is that structural factors are more important than
either party or individual characteristics of councilmen. Although the
number of cases is small, some differences emerge in sharp relief. For
example, permanent alliances are of less importance in the South; and in
this respect councilmen from the Islands are more similar to those from
the North than from the South. The shifting nature of local politics in the
South is again apparent here, as is the variation between the patterns of
the Islands and mainland Southern Italy. Other interesting findings
concern differing perceptions of reality: what to the PCI and PSI-PSDI in
the Center seem to be permanent alliances are viewed by the Christian
Democrats as changing party alliances. Three times as many DC and two
times as many PSI-PSDI councilmen view alliances as permanent when in
the majority rather than the minority. The broad outlines of differences
are clear: permanent party alliances are of greatest importance in the larger
TABLE 7
HOW THE COUNCIL DECIDES, BY PARTY
(% choosing that alternative)
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communes. They are of least importance in the communes of the mainland
South. And the same situation is often viewed differently by the parties.
Additional evidence of the relatively greater impact of situational and
structural effects over partisan affiliation comes from a variance compo-
nents analysis of the choice of alternative 3 (&dquo;For the majority of
problems, alliances among various parties are more or less permanent&dquo;).4
This analysis takes the selection of this third alternative as the dependent
variable and could accept up to forty independent variables to explain
variations in the dependent variable.
Two different analyses were performed. The first included twelve
independent variables or predictors including geographical area, party,
majority-minority relationship with giunta, communal majority, source of
communal initiatives, relations with prefect, and five variables that
referred to personal characteristics of the respondent-conception of
democracy, social class, education, frequency of church attendance, and
occupation. The analysis program tries each of these predictors and
chooses the one that reduces the variance in the dependent variable by the
largest amount. It splits that independent variable into two components by
using every possible combination of the codes of the variable and selects
the bifurcation that explains the largest amount of variance. It then
proceeds with each of the two parts and seeks to split them in a similar
manner. The result is a &dquo;tree&dquo; in which the branches continue to fork until
no more variance is being explained or the number of cases (as specified by
the analyst) is too small.
The results of the analysis using twelve predictors demonstrate clearly
that whether the commune has a Center-Left majority or not is the best
predictor of the respondent selecting alternative 3. The second best is
geographical area of the country. Only then does educational level enter as
a predictor, and it is the only personal characteristic of the councilman to
appear. The three predictors of communal majority, area, and education
together explain 32% of the total variance.
Unfortunately, the large number of variables initially chosen multiplies
missing data problems; full data existed for only 213 of the 382
respondents. Consequently, the analysis was repeated with only the five
best predictors of the above analysis, which were communal majority,
geographical area, party, size of commune, and education. Data were
available on all five for 354 respondents. Communal majority-Center-Left
against other combinations-again emerged as the best predictor, followed
by geographical area as in the previous analysis. Party emerges at the third
split, along with size of commune. Party is closely related to education
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because of the low levels of formal education of so many Communists. But
education itself is the least important of the five predictors.
This analysis suggests several conclusions. One is that there are
remarkable similarities of perception among the councilmen in the sample,
because the objective datum of communal majority was the best predictor
of the dominant style of local decision-making. This is undoubtedly a
phenomenon that does vary mainly with the composition of the majority.
With geographical area next, the best predictors of this style are thus
structural variables rather than the personal idiosyncrasies of the respond-
ent or his party affiliation. The fact that councilmen of different parties
reach the same conclusions concerning the patterns of local decision-
making increases confidence in their other perceptions. And this analysis
also reinforces other findings that demonstrate the relatively greater
importance of structural factors over personal and political ones in many
aspects of local politics.
This conclusion is confirmed by a &dquo;tree&dquo; analysis of the predictors of
the existence of a Center-Left coalition giunta. The two variables, size of
commune and geographical area, explain 56% of the variance in the
composition of the giunta. It is clear that outside of Northeastern Italy,
the Center-Left formula is dominant in the larger communes; 94% of the
respondents in those with over 50,000 inhabitants serve under Center-Left
giunte. And even in the smaller communes (under 50,000), 72% of the
councilmen in the Northwest, North-central, and Island Italy work with
Center-Left giunte, compared with only 20% in similar-sized communes
in other areas.
CONCLUSIONS
Several general findings emerge from this examination of local
decision-making. The importance of the environment of local decision-
making has been firmly established, as well as the impact of national
considerations on that environment. The &dquo;Opening to the Left&dquo; on the
national level greatly altered patterns of conflict and cooperation in local
politics. The majority and minority have differing patterns of perceptions
of how communal decisions are made, varying estimates of the influence
of groups, and contradictory opinions of the nature of influence within
the council. Although there are many differences among the parties, on
many variables party differences are not as important as differences in
relationship to the giunta. The mayor is everywhere the dominant figure.
[203]Barnes / DECISION-MAKING IN ITALIAN POLITICS
He is especially important for the majority parties and in the smallest
communes. And, probably because of the party’s dominance of the
majority and of the smallest communes, he is also important within the
Christian Democratic party.
Territorial differences are the generally expected ones. Parties have
somewhat different profiles in areas of strength and weakness. Areas of
intense competition and polarization, such as the Northeast and Center,
have profiles different from other areas. The mainland South exhibits
traces of clientelism and easily shifting political alliances to a greater
degree than elsewhere. The Islands are more similar to the rest of Italy
than to the South.
Communes of different size have quite different patterns. In the
smallest communes national considerations are least important. Friends
and family are very highly ranked, groups do not take much of an interest
in local affairs, and the party is not omnipresent. There is little
specialization. The mayor is the dominant figure. Party, groups, profes-
sionalization, and specialization assume commanding importance in the
middle-sized communes. It is here that there seems to be the closest
linkage between the citizen and his representative. The larger communes
exhibit a more impersonal politics. National considerations assume greater
importance and politicians have an indirect relationship with citizens.
Public opinion in general becomes more relevant. The involvement of
groups and individuals in local matters increases with size of commune.
However, their influence-as opposed to interest-seems to be greater in
the middle-sized communes. Perhaps interest group politics focuses more
on the bureaucracy in the larger communes, but this is mere speculation.
To conclude, in small communes personal considerations emerge as
most important. Politics in the largest communes is the most impersonal
and closely reflects national patterns. It is the middle-sized communes that
approach the classical pattern of tightly organized parties, wide consulta-
tion, and an active group life.
But the most important general finding that emerges from our research
is that there is no single national pattern. Large, middle-sized, and small
communes are different in their patterns of decision-making. The Center
and South are different; the Northwest and Northeast are different.
Despite the formal similarities of the institutions of local government,
local decision-making reflects the variety of a diversified polity.
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NOTES
1. For an excellent recent study of some limited aspects of local politics in Italy
see Fried (1971). For an introduction to the literature, see Fried (1971, 1963).
2. Italy is divided into geographical areas-the Northeast, North-central, North-
west, Center, South, and Islands. As Italian "regions" are specific administrative
subdivisions much smaller than these units, we will call the areal subdivisions "areas,"
or "geographical areas." All percentages refer to the sample. Official data on the
composition of local giunte are difficult to find.
3. La Palombara (1964) describes the close ties between business and the DC.
Perhaps the responses should not be taken at face value.
4. See Sonquist et al. (1971) for a description of these procedures.
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